Como en la psicología del individuo, en la pólis se encuentran dos principios contrapuestos, las pasiones y la ley. En los animales gregarios existe también el factor político que lleva a trabajar a muchos por un fin común. Pero en el hombre hay una diferencia en su actividad política, es decir, la ley que proviene de la razón y que no se puede expresar sin palabras. Por ello Aristóteles, a diferencia de Platón, otorga una función constructiva a los sofistas, como (...) técnicos de la retórica que es necesaria para establecer la ley en la ciudad. La política es la ciencia superior que articula la ética y la retórica para que los hombres en la ciudad puedan llegar al fin último, la felicidad. No hay, para Aristóteles, un fin exterior metapolítico, que pueda satisfacer separadamente los componentes superiores de la psyché humana. As on a person’s psychology, there are in the pólis two opposing principles, passions and law. In gregarious animals, there is also a political factor that leads many individuals to work for a common purpose. But in man there is a difference in his political activity, i.e., the law that comes from reason and cannot be expressed without words. For this reason, Aristotle, unlike Plato, gives a constructive function to Sophists, as experts on rhetoric, which is necessary to establish law in the city. Politics is a superior science that articulates ethics and rhetoric in order that men in the city can reach the ultimate goal, happiness. For Aristotle, there is not an external metapolitical objective, which could separately satisfy the upper components of the human psyche. (shrink)

El autor de este artículo lee el Apologeticum de Tertuliano como un texto de transición ideológica entre los primeros escritos mesiánicos del cristianismo y la teología política del siglo IV, i.e. una obra que fusiona teología imperial y cristianismo. Dejando de lado las disputas teológicas con el judaísmo, Tertuliano propone una discusión frontal con los romanos sobre la relación del concepto de divinidad con el poder político y quiere mostrar que la teología y la ética de los cristianos son mucho (...) más apropiadas para una realidad como el Imperio romano que las que ha impuesto la tradición politeísta. En este razonamiento se destaca la correspondencia entre monoteísmo y monarquía universal. The author of this paper reads Apologeticum by Tertullian as a text of ideological transition between the early messianic Christian writings and political fourth century theology, i.e. a work that combines Imperial theology and Christianity. Leaving apart the theological disputes with Judaism, Tertullian proposes a frontal discussion with the Romans on the relationship of the concept of divinity with political power and wants to show that theology and Christian ethics are much more appropriate for a reality as Roman Empire which has imposed the polytheistic tradition. His argumentation stands out the reciprocation between monotheism and universal monarchy. (shrink)

El presente artículo estudia las representaciones de mujeres con VIH/sida, en el libro Tiempos del SIDA. Relatos de la vida real, de Myriam Francis. El trabajo inicia con un análisis sobre la exclusión de los sujetos femeninos de la literatura “seropositiva” latinoamericana. Se plantea que las pocas representaciones que existen se enfocan en “mujeres sospechosas”, lo cual se repite, hasta cierto punto, en los textos de Francis seleccionados: “La última puerta”, “La viuda alegre” y “La chica alegre”. Luego, se ofrece (...) una explicación sobre el contexto en el que surgen las historias, un “pabellón-moridero” que se describe más bien como un espacio ameno, el cual, sin embargo, enfatiza la tragicidad que rodea a cada “caso”. Después, se estudian los tres relatos mencionados, en los que se mueven los símbolos primarios del mal (la mancilla, el pecado y la culpabilidad), de manera que una mujer es representada como una “víctima inocente” y otras, como “víctimas culpables” (fundamentalmente por sus “estilos de vida nocivos”). Finalmente, el trabajo concluye que la narrativa de Francis moviliza algunos principios de la “teoría de la degeneración”, para explicar las situaciones experimentadas por los personajes femeninos y ofrecer un mensaje didáctico-moralizante. (shrink)

"Filone di Alessandria, La filosofia mosaica: La creazione del mondo, secondo Mosè, trad, de C. Kraus Reggiani, Le allegorie delle Leggi, trad. di R.Radice; Prefazioni, apparati e commentari di R. Radice; Monografia introduttiva di G. Reale e R. Radice, Milano, 1987 (Rusconi, 580 páginas)." published on 30 Mar 1990 by Brill.

Este trabajo quedó segundo en la IV Olimpiada de filosofía que organiza FICUM en la modalidad de secundaria y bachillerato para promocionar la filosofía entre los jóvenes.

En este artículo se presenta una nueva traducción al español del breve opúsculo De mystica theologia junto con una introducción al texto. La introducción se concentra en el análisis de algunos puntos que son especialmente útiles para entender el texto en cuestión: su historia y su significado para el neoplatonismo y, aun más importante, su relevancia en términos de una exposición sumamente original de la doctrina cristiana desde la perspectiva de un neoplatónico; la importancia de este texto en la filosofía (...) contemporánea también se hace notar; y, finalmente, su crucial importancia para la así llamada “teología negativa”. (shrink)

We analyse the relationship between applicability and effectiveness of legal norms from a philosophical perspective. In particular, we distinguish between two concepts of applicability. The external applicability of norms refers to institutional duties; a norm N is externally applicable if and only if a judge is legally obliged to apply N to some case c. Internal applicability refers instead to the sphere of validity of legal norms. A norm N is internally applicable to actions regulated by its sphere of validity. (...) We also explore the consequences of a thesis which maintains that applicability restricts the concept of effectiveness, so that only applicable norms can be considered effective. Our analysis illustrates that a proper reconstruction of the concept of applicability is of great importance not only for understanding the concept of effectiveness but also for providing insight into the nature of law. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to defend, contra Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (F&PP), that the theory of natural selection (NS) is a perfectly bona fide empirical unified explanatory theory. F&PP claim there is nothing non-truistic, counterfactual-supporting, of an “adaptive” character and common to different explanations of trait evolution. In his debate with Fodor, and in other works, Sober defends NS but claims that, compared with classical mechanics (CM) and other standard theories, NS is peculiar in that its explanatory models are (...) a priori (a trait shared with few other theories). We argue that NS provides perfectly bona fide adaptive explanations of phenotype evolution, unified by a common natural-selection guiding principle. First, we introduce the debate and reply to F&PP’s main argument against NS. Then, by reviewing different examples and analyzing Fisher’s model in detail, we show that NS explanations of phenotypic evolution share a General Natural Selection Principle. Third, by elaborating an analogy with CM, we argue against F&PP’s claim that such a principle would be a mere truism and thus explanatorily useless, and against Sober’s thesis that NS models/explanations have a priori components that are not present in CM and other common empirical theories. Irrespective of differences in other respects, the NS guiding principle has the same epistemic status as other guiding principles in other highly unified theories such as CM. We argue that only by pointing to the guiding principle-driven nature that it shares with CM and other highly unified theories, something no-one has done yet in this debate, one can definitively show that NS is not defective in F&PP’s sense: in the respects relevant to the debate, Natural Selection is as defective and as epistemically peculiar as Classical Mechanics and other never questioned theories. (shrink)

The epistemic status of Natural Selection has seemed intriguing to biologists and philosophers since the very beginning of the theory to our present times. One prominent contemporary example is Elliott Sober, who claims that NS, and some other theories in biology, and maybe in economics, are peculiar in including explanatory models/conditionals that are a priori in a sense in which explanatory models/conditionals in Classical Mechanics and most other standard theories are not. Sober’s argument focuses on some “would promote” sentences that (...) according to him, play a central role in NS explanations and are both causal and a priori. Lange and Rosenberg criticize Sober arguing that, though there may be some unspecific a priori causal claims, there are not a priori causal claims that specify particular causal factors. Although we basically agree with Lange and Rosenberg’s criticism, we think it remains silent about a second important element in Sober’s dialectics, namely his claim that, contrary to what happens in mechanics, in NS explanatory conditionals are a priori, and that this is so in quite specific explanatory models. In this paper we criticize this second element of Sober’s argument by analyzing what we take to be the four possible interpretations of Sober’s claim, and argue that, terminological preferences aside, the possible senses in which explanatory models in NS can qualify, or include elements that can qualify, as a priori, also apply to CM and other standard, highly unified theories. We conclude that this second claim is unsound, or at least that more needs to be said in order to sustain that NS explanatory models are a priori in a sense in which CM models are not. (shrink)

Explanations in genetics have intriguing aspects to both biologists and philosophers, and there is no account that satisfactorily elucidates such explanations. The aim of this article is to analyze the kind of explanations usually given in Classical (Transmission) Genetics (CG) and to present in detail the application of an account of explanation as ampliative, specialized nomological embedding to elucidate the such explanations. First, we present explanations in CG in the classical format of inferences with the explanans as the premises and (...) the explanandum as the conclusion and compare them with explanations in other paradigmatic explanatory fields such as Classical Mechanics. Second, we summarize the main aspects discussed in the literature with regard the peculiarities of genetic explanations. Third, we introduce the account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized nomological embedding making use of Sneedian structuralism, in particular the notions of theory-net, fundamental law or guiding principle, specialization, and special laws. Finally, we apply this account to the case of CG and show that this analysis sheds light to the intriguing aspects of genetic explanations and remove most of their alleged oddities. (shrink)

This paper will review the strategies and learning trajectories followed to tap the opportunities opened by the successive waves of biotechnologies: early imitators followed by late imitators in the first generation of biosimilars (erythropoietin, insulins, interferons), and then sequential entry and skipping stages during the second generation (monoclonal antibodies).

Justo antes de la pandemia por COVID-19, la Organización Mundial de la Salud definió unas prioridades de trabajo para la década 2020-2030. Un grupo interdisciplinario de profesionales de la salud reflexiona sobre estas prioridades, determinando unas categorías de análisis y, desde una perspectiva bioética, analiza cada una de ellas, ve su pertinencia, algunos eventos causales, las implicaciones que pueden tener si no son enfrentadas adecuadamente y hace sugerencias sobre la forma de llevarlas a cabo. En esta primera entrega se analiza (...) el primer grupo de prioridades estratégicas: “poblaciones más sanas”. En las conclusiones se destaca la conveniencia de acometer cada una de ellas de una manera colaborativa, gubernamental y privada; de reestructurar el sector salud con base en estas prioridades, aprovechando la experiencia obtenida en la lucha contra el COVID-19. La relación del ser humano con el medio ambiente también debe cambiar, apelando a la responsabilidad humana por el cuidado del planeta. (shrink)

The notion that patients’ medical decision-making capacity depends on risk considerations has some acceptance in the bioethical literature. However, it arouses some criticism since it seems to give rise to paternalistic attitudes. In addition, the idea of capacity assessment as a collaborative space in which aid is given to the patient is emphasized so that they can decide about their life. It does not seem ethically acceptable to pose the evaluation as a simple observer report. Capacity assessment can sometimes be (...) impossible or inconsequential. In short, capacity assessment is a procedure that, used wisely, can allow the patient to take charge of their life. Misused, it can be the gateway to unjustified paternalistic actions. (shrink)

En "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz señala que las lagunas jurídicas existen sólo cuando el derecho habla con voz incierta o cuando habla con muchas voces, pero que no hay lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio. En este último caso habría reglas de clausura, analíticamente verdaderas, que impiden la ocurrencia de esas lagunas. Según Raz, si hay una laguna en un sistema jurídico, entonces no es verdadero ni falso que exista una razón concluyente para ejecutar cierta acción. Así, una (...) de las contribuciones más importantes de Raz a la solución del problema de las lagunas jurídicas es subrayar que el discurso jurídico no está completamente controlado por la bivalencia. Sin embargo, a menudo se sostiene que el rechazo de la bivalencia conduce a contradicciones. Si esta afirmación fuese verdadera, entonces la solución de Raz al problema de las lagunas jurídicas se vería seriamente amenazada. En este artículo mostramos, con ayuda de una herramienta analítica sofisticada, i.e., la lógica de la verdad de G.H. von Wright, que el rechazo de la bivalencia sólo nos compromete a aceptar la conclusión trivial de que puede haber proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas. Por esta razón, el trabajo de Raz todavía puede ser considerado un buen punto de partida para analizar las relaciones entre normas, razonamiento práctico y lagunas jurídicas. Sin embargo, también mostramos que para admitir proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas, las tesis de Raz deben ser reformuladas. De otra manera, la tesis de que no existen lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio no sería compatible con el rechazo de la bivalencia. /// In his paper "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principie of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show--with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e., von Wright's truth-logic--that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth-values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting-point for analyzing the relationships between norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)